Moltmann states that the mediatorship and vicariousness of Christ as presented by every christology that is eschatologically orientated is determined by the decision that is taken regarding the question whether Christ makes himself redundant when the kingdom of God comes.1.57 Van Ruler answers this question positively and thus sees the mediatorship and vicariousness of Christ purely in terms of his substitution for us, of his expiatory sacrifice for us. According to Moltmann however, ``its purpose is not to make itself superfluous, but to become the basis for new, redeemed existence, which it owes to the crucified Christ.'' This new existence ``does not mean a restoration of the creation which has been made obsolete by human sin, but the `creation of the end-time.''' Thus Christ did not die only as that expiatory offering in which the law was restored or the original creation was reconstituted after the fall of man.1.58 Thus Moltmann presents us with a theology in which the crucified Christ is the basis of a new creation. This new creation is understood in terms of a nova creatio that ontologically replaces the old creation. This present world is not saved, we are saved from this world. This theology is radically different to that of Van Ruler. We have seen that in his Christology Van Ruler follows Calvin in accepting the `radical anselminian understanding of the substitution.' God is in the special form of Christ only in order to bear the guilt of sin and take it away from created reality so that it may once again stand before the countenance of God. The assumptio carnis is only necessary because of sin. It is an emergency measure because God is not concerned with Christ but with creation, with the kingdom of glory, with humanity. Protologically and eschatologically the purpose of God does not lie in the Immanuel, in the God with us, but in humanity, in man before God. In the eschaton the special form of God in Christ will be laid aside. ``Protologically and eschatologically, all things will then be directed towards the naked existence of things as such before God, without the veil of sin and without the veil of Christ.''1.59
There is no doubt that Moltmann has correctly understood Van Ruler when he says that, according to Van Ruler, ``in the Christ event there is a negation (expiation) of the negative (sin). The positive element is reality itself, which is understood as creation and as kingdom.''1.60Following his brief, yet correct summary of Van Ruler's doctrine of the messianic intermezzo, Moltmann draws the following conclusions: Firstly, because the suffering Christ is only described functionally the title of Son can only refer to the Godhead of Christ and not the relationship of the whole person of Jesus to the Father. Secondly, if Christ is understood only in terms of the expiation of sin, the aim of his mission is the restoration of the original creation and humanity. Thus nothing new has come into creation and the eschaton is nothing more than a restitutio in integrum. Thirdly, this identification of kingdom and creation leads to an unhistorical conception of God and human reality. Fourthly, if the mission of Christ is only to remove the guilt of sin, the possibility of sin is not necessarily removed. If redeemed existence does not contain some boundless `more' than created existence, the speculative question of when the next fall would take place must be asked. Fifthly, as the kingdom is identified with creation it must be said that God was `all in all' in the original creation. In the sixth place, Van Ruler's functional christology means that Christ only intervenes for the future consummation and thus there is no actualization or fulfillment of the kingdom of God in the present. In the seventh place, a merely functional christology must end in a non-christian eschatology of being, obtained from somewhere else. Thus Van Ruler's christology is modalistic and must ultimately end in an un-christian monotheism or pantheism.1.61
These are certainly serious objections and if correct would have severe consequences for the whole of Van Ruler's theology. We will now discuss these objections one by one to see whether they do indeed apply to Van Ruler's theology. In his first objection Moltmann states, ``Only the functional titles like Kyrios, Christ and sacrifice denote the person of the God-man. In that case the title of Son can only denote the Godhead of Christ and not the relationship of the whole person of Jesus to the Father.''1.62 This objection is difficult to understand. It seems that Moltmann is accusing Van Ruler of Nestorianism because he distinguishes between the two natures of the incarnated Christ and talks of the pre-existence of the divine nature. Van Ruler certainly makes a careful distinction between the eternal Son of God as the second person of the eternal trinity and the Son of God in human flesh. But the eternal Son of God is not `exhausted' in the fact that he became flesh. It seems that Moltmann agrees with Bauke that as long as one confesses the `extra-calvinisticum' and hence refuses to allow the Logos to be enclosed within the finite human nature, then one must remain caught in a dualism.1.63 This, of course, refers to the mystery of the two natures in one person which the Heidelberg Catechism Lords Day 18 expresses. Thus Van Ruler refuses to confuse the two natures of Christ but this does not exclude their union `without division' and `without separation.' He states, ``In Christology the doctrine of the unio personalis sive hypostatica is decisive. It expresses that in the Logos the divine and human nature, the being of God and the being of man are united. It also contains the idea that the human nature that was taken on by the Logos, the natura humana assumpta, is not an own hypostasis, not an own I, not an own person but rather finds its hypostasis in the Logos himself. There was never a Mister Jesus, but always only God-the-Son-in-human-flesh. In my opinion this is the indispensable kernel of the mystery of the incarnation - however fragmented these formulas of dogma must be.''1.64 Van Ruler does justice to the unity and to the distinction without doing violence to the mystery. No one can escape this unity and this distinction if they wish to speak in conformity with Scripture.1.65
If the `extra-Calvinisticum' is denied the Logos would be enclosed within the finite human nature of Christ. Surely this would be a denial of the true divinity of Christ. Thus it would appear that, not only is Moltmann's objection that the distinction between the eternal Son of God and the suffering Christ deprives Jesus of the title `Son', wrong, but Moltmann's denial of this distinction is also a denial of the divinity of Jesus Christ.1.66
The second objection presented by Moltmann states that if Christ is only understood in terms of expiation for sin, nothing new has come into creation over against the original creation and thus the eschaton is only a restitutio in integrum.
This objection is somewhat surprising because Van Ruler expressly denies this. Firstly from the christological point of view there is no place for the idea that in Christ we have received the true humanity, the common humanity, solidarity and thus the original creation. It must always be objected that Christ is more than an ideogram, he is an historical figure. Perhaps he displayed the true humanity, but he did this in our place and above all he displayed this true humanity as God and not purely as man. Finally he not only displayed true humanity but is also centrally concerned with the deepest part of the being of man. ``These four elements: the historicity, substitution, divinity and redemption are the constitutive elements in christology, these have made it impossible to stop at the idea that in the eschatological reality, which Christ is, there is only a return of the original creation.''1.67 Secondly, from the eschatological point of view it is impossible to say the eschaton is a restitutio in integrumbecause history is taken up into the eschaton. ``History will be returned in the eschaton. On the one hand the eschaton is the purpose of history; if there is no eschaton there is no history. On the other hand history is the content of the eschaton; if there is no history there is no eschaton.''1.68``History is the totality of the ingredients from which the eschaton is made up of.''1.69 In other words the eschaton is the summarizing of history to unity. Everything that is saved in history is saved unto the eschaton.
Thus according to Van Ruler the proton does return in the eschaton, but a plus must be acknowledged in the eschaton. This plus is to be understood in terms of the history of sin and grace. Through the experience of the confession of guilt and the proclamation of grace we become `fire-proof' and go over from the posse non peccare to the non posse peccare.1.70 The eschaton stands in a completely correlative relationship with history, and not only with the history of guilt and grace, the history of Israel, Christ and christianization, but with all history. The eschaton is the synthesizing, the recapitulation and consummation of history to unity.1.71Thus there is no restitutio in integrum.
In demonstrating that there is not an identity of the original creation and the eschatological kingdom we have also answered the next three objections presented by Moltmann. It can be plainly seen that there is not an unhistorical understanding of God and human reality in Van Ruler's theology. The speculative question of when the next fall would take place has also been unambiguously answered. If the kingdom was the same as creation then it would be true that it must be said of creation that there God was `all in all', but with the plus exhibited in the eschaton above the proton it cannot be said in exactly the same sense that God was all in all in both proton and eschaton. Before the Fall God had a direct relationship with man (Gen. 3:8) but even then there was room for growth toward perfection. This is the idea that is expressed by the theologoumenon of the covenant of works, that by his obedience Adam would have entered into a closer communion with God.1.72 Thus it would be wrong to think of creation as a closed event which produced a static and perfect result, a completed world in a `state of rectitude'. God was not `all in all' in the proton in the same sense that he will be `all in all' in the eschaton. The proton must be thought of in terms of the posse non peccare before man has actualized his freedom (Tillich) and chosen for good or for evil while the eschaton must be understood in terms of the non posse peccare.1.73
Moltmann's sixth objection states that in Van Ruler's functional christology there is no actualization or fulfillment of the kingdom in the present. But this objection is contrary to the whole thrust of Van Ruler's theology. Through the person and work of Christ all reality has been saved. The guilt of existence has been reconciled, death and the demons have been overcome. Once and for all the kingdom of God has been set up in Christ. In Christ we are really and truly saved. The kingdom of God is present as salvation in Christ. However this kingdom is concealed in the flesh and will be revealed in the eschaton. The kingdom of Christ exists in the present as a modality of the kingdom of God.
The fact that the kingdom of Christ is a modality of the kingdom of God is not a confirmation of Moltmann's further objection that Van Ruler's christology is modalistic. This would only be true if Van Ruler did not distinguish between the divine and the human natures of Christ and did not support the `extra calvinisticum'. Therefore this objection could only be maintained if the Son of God is completely described by the incarnation, by the form of the crucified - as occurs in Moltmann's theology.1.74 In any case does Van Ruler's thought result in an unchristian monotheism or pantheism? Van Ruler understands the trinity in the terms of the confessions of the Church. God is one in essence, yet distinguished in three persons, which are co-eternal and co-essential (Belgic Confession, Article 8) According to Van Ruler, in his mercy the Second Person of the trinity took on human flesh to save us from sin. In the eschaton this veil of flesh falls away and then ``nothing will remain other than the triune God and all things in their naked (redeemed) existence.''1.75 Thus God continues to exist in his eternal triune nature as this has always been confessed by the Christian Church. There is no trace of an unchristian monotheism in Van Ruler's thought. Van Ruler is also aware of the danger that `the naked (redeemed) existence of things' might be understood pantheistically and says: ``No matter how strong the inclination that this eschatological perspective is the same as pantheism...the border between Creator and creation is respected. But all mediation between God and the world and with this all particularity in created reality falls away.''1.76
We have examined each of Moltmann's objections and seen them, without exception, to be incorrect. It would seem Moltmann has not understood Van Ruler's theology after all. Anyway their theologies are absolutely opposed to each other and rest on completely different interpretations of Scripture. According to Moltmann the Son of God became flesh to condemn creation and replace it with a nova creatio. The mediating work of Christ does come to an end but he remains as the crucified and as the ground of the new creation.1.77 Van Ruler, however, follows the Reformed understanding of reconciliation as substitution in which creation is respected as creation and held fast in faith. There is indeed newness, novitas. The new, however is precisely the old, only radically renewed, totally redeemed from all forms of corruption.1.78 Van Ruler states: ``when one does not understand the Gospel in Israelitic terms one understands it in gnostic terms. Tertium non datur.''1.79
The question is whether Moltmann's theology is really christian theology and what the consequences of this theology would be for the Christian Church. However this is beyond the boundaries of this essay and our discussion of Moltmann's theology and his objections will end here.